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1 Introduction
Higher investment rates and hence a higher level of the capital stock in the economy
could increase productivity and national welfare. A relevant policy issue for any gov-
ernment is then how to stimulate firms’ investment effectively. Many OECD countries
have frequently used the corporation tax system to encourage investment. In the last 20
years, most developed economies have cut their statutory corporation tax rates and in
some cases, they have also increased the tax deductibility of capital expenditures. More
generous deductions for capital expenditure increase the present value of depreciation
allowances and consequently reduce the user cost of capital, which in turn increases the
incentive to invest (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Hayashi, 1982; and Summers, 1981). In
the United States, accelerated first-year investment allowances for equipment (known as
the bonus depreciation deduction) were available between 2002 and 2004 and then again,
between 2008 and 2013 after the onset of the global financial crisis. In Germany be-
tween 2009 and 2010, depreciation for fixed assets could be temporarily calculated using
the declining-balance method, increasing the proportion of total allowable deductions
taken in early years with respect to the generally permitted straight-line method. In the
United Kingdom, before the fiscal year 2008/09,1 accelerated first-year capital allowances
(FYAs) for investment in plant and machinery were available to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) at a rate of 40 per cent compared to the standard rate of 25 per cent
available to larger companies.
Many have advocated the use of accelerated depreciation to stimulate business spend-
ing on plant and equipment (for example, Feldstein, 2006). Nevertheless, it is not easy to
demonstrate convincingly a causal effect of accelerated depreciation on investment spend-
ing, partly because any such tax incentives are likely to be correlated with other policies
and macro-economic conditions that affect investment behaviour. As the main innovation
of this study, we examine the impact of a change to the tax depreciation schedule for a
group of companies in the United Kingdom that occurred due to an exogenous change
in the qualifying threshold for FYAs. Specifically, in the UK, firms could qualify as an
SME and hence claim FYAs if they were below two of three thresholds based on turnover,
total assets, and number of employees. In 2004, implementing a Recommendation of the
European Commission on the definition of SMEs, the UK increased the turnover and
total assets thresholds more than twofold. We exploit this quasi-experimental setting
where our control group is composed of companies that did not qualify before 2004 but
1The United Kingdom also introduced and expanded repeatedly the Annual Investment Allowance,
a 100 percent allowance for expenditure on qualifying plant and machinery.
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became qualified under the new thresholds from 2004. Companies which never quali-
fied for FYAs throughout our sample period constitute the control group. We compare
investment before and after 2004 across the two groups using a difference-in-differences
analysis.
We find a substantial positive effect of higher depreciation allowances on firms’ invest-
ment. Relative to the control group, FYAs raised investment in eligible assets of newly
qualified companies by between 2.1 and 2.6 percentage points within 3 years of the change
in the definition of SMEs. At the mean, this translates into an 11 per cent increase of
investment. In contrast to much of the literature, we show that this large effect cannot
be explained by a cash flow effect and hence, this is entirely a cost of capital effect. Our
results can therefore be fully translated into an elasticity of investment with respect to
the user cost of about 8.7.2
Our benchmark findings are in line with the large effects estimated in the recent
literature on the impact on investment of the US bonus depreciation and the US domestic
production activities deduction, with the caveat that the calculation of our elasticity does
not include a cash flow effect. Regarding the effects of the bonus depreciation, House and
Shapiro (2008) find an elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital of
between 6 and 14. Zwick and Mahon (2014) find a central estimate of an elasticity of
7.2. Investigating the US domestic production activities deduction, Ohrn (2015) finds an
average elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of 7.8.
Our elasticity of investment translates into a corresponding, much lower elasticity of
the capital stock. Evaluated at the mean, we find an elasticity of the capital stock with
respect to the user cost of around 1.6 – similar to Zwick and Mahon (2014) but rather
higher than that found in the earlier literature of between 0.25 and 1 (see, for example,
Auerbach and Hassett, 1992; Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard, 1994; Chirinko, Fazzari
and Meyer, 1999; Desai and Goolsbee, 2004; Bond and Xing, 2015).
Our work differs considerably from previous studies and contributes to the literature in
the following ways. First, we investigate the effects of tax incentives on investment using
changes in the user cost of capital due to an exogenous policy change. More specifically,
our research design is based on a variation in the qualifying threshold for claiming FYAs.
In contrast, most of the studies on bonus depreciation use variation in the tax treatment
of different kinds of assets to identify the impact of tax incentives on investment (see,
2The discount rate used in this calculation of the elasticity is 7 per cent, in line with the most recent
literature on the effect of the tax system on investment (Zwick and Mahon, 2014 and Ohrn, 2015).
For smaller firms such as those analysed here, the discount rate could be as high as 15 or 20 per cent
(Poterba and Summers, 1995; Graham and Harvey, 2001; and Jagannathan, 2015). In this case, the
elasticity would be 5.3 and 4.6, respectively.
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for example, Desai and Goolsbee, 2004; Edgerton, 2010; House and Shapiro, 2008; Zwick
and Mahon, 2014). This implies that identification in these studies is based on variation
across different industries using different mixes of capital assets which are subject to
different tax depreciation schedules and (or) have different life spans. In this context,
as recognised by Zwick and Mahon (2014), industry-specific shocks may coincide with
the provision of bonus depreciation, which leads to endogeneity problems.3 In contrast,
as the changes in the qualifying thresholds for the FYAs are not related to aggregate
economic conditions or firm-level unobserved shocks, our estimation results are less likely
to suffer from endogeneity biases.
Second, we analyse a permanent change in depreciation allowances: FYAs were re-
garded as a permanent feature of the UK tax code4 and the increase in the qualifying
thresholds was announced as permanent. In contrast, studies investigating bonus de-
preciation in the US (Desai and Goolsbee, 2004; Edgerton, 2010; House and Shapiro,
2008; and Zwick and Mahon, 2014) examine a temporary measure. With a permanent
tax incentive, we can rule out the possibility that the large response we find is due to
inter-temporal shifting whereby firms have an incentive to bring forward investment in
order to capture the transient tax benefits.
Third, we use data from corporation tax returns. This has several advantages over
accounting data. For example, tax returns allow us to control precisely for firms’ marginal
tax rates, which can differ substantially across UK companies due to a complex marginal
rate structure described below. Both the marginal corporation tax rate and depreciation
allowances affect the user cost of capital, and so it is useful to control for the marginal
tax rate differences. Compared to accounting data, tax returns allow us to measure the
marginal tax rate precisely.5 Another advantage of using the tax return data is that we
obtain precise information on firms’ qualified investment in plant and machinery, which
is generally not available in accounting data, especially for smaller, privately-held firms.6
Moreover, with corporation tax returns we observe when firms were actually liable to pay
the corporation tax, which is an important factor in identifying whether there was an
effect on capital expenditure through the higher availability of cash arising from a lower
3Zwick and Mahon (2014) produce various robustness checks to show that this is not the case in their
sample.
4FYAs were available to SMEs since 1997 and made permanent in 1998.
5Devereux et al. (2015) find substantial measurement error in the marginal tax rates based on financial
statements, relative to those based on tax returns.
6Available accounting data from FAME (Bureau van Dijk) for UK privately held firms offer a more
general measure of the stock of fixed assets including both equipment and structures. However, FYAs
were not available for structures and buildings. For a discussion of the challenges involved when inves-
tigating investment behaviour using accounting data, see Bond and Van Reneen (2007).
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tax payment. Zwick and Mahon (2014) also employ corporation tax returns. Although
they also find a large response of the intensive margin of investment to tax incentives, our
results cannot be explained by the same mechanisms (that is, by a cash flow effect), as we
clarify below. Additionally, we also match the corporation tax returns with accounting
data so that we have rich information on the financial and tax position of the firm.
Fourth, our study examines the investment behaviour of medium-sized, private UK
firms rather than large, public firms that are the focus of most other studies.7 The
effectiveness of investment incentives could be rather different for smaller, private firms.
For example, they could be more financially constrained. Moreover, small and medium
firms may not be able to fully understand a complex tax code and therefore, the tax
incentives may be less salient for them. In fact, we find that firms in our sample responded
by investing more following the reduction in the user cost of capital and that they appear
to understand the tax code well. As far as we know, ours is one of the few studies which
specifically analyse the effectiveness of investment tax incentives for smaller private firms.
Fifth, we test whether the positive effects of FYAs on investment can be explained
by the cash flow effect. Theoretically, FYAs not only reduce the user cost of capital but
also bring a cash windfall to the qualified firms as more generous depreciation allowances
reduce the tax liability. If a firm is financially constrained and if internal and external
sources of finance are not perfect substitutes, this windfall could increase investment.
There is a vast literature suggesting that firms’ investment behaviour is correlated with
cash flow. For the UK, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Bond and Meghir (1994)
find that investment is positively related to cash flow. Regarding the cash flow effects of
the bonus depreciation, in recent US evidence, Edgerton (2010) finds that firms with more
cash flow respond more to more generous depreciation allowances, although Zwick and
Mahon (2014) and Ohrn (2015) find that firms that are more likely to be cash constrained
reacted more to bonus depreciation deductions. In the spirit of Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988), these authors split the sample to exploit cross-sectional variation in the
cost premium for external finance using various indicators for the existence of financial
constraints: for example, the size of the firm, whether the firm pays dividends and mea-
sures of cash flow derived from financial statements. A problem with this sample-split
approach is that other sources of mis-specification may not be common across different
sub-samples of firms (Bond and Van Reneen, 2007): for example, for smaller, younger
7For example, in Zwick and Mahon (2014) the average volume of firms’ annual sales is US$180 million.
In our sample, average annual sales volume is £15.7 million (about US$25 million) for the treated group.
Other studies such as Edgerton (2010), Ohrn (2015) and less recent ones such as those surveyed in Bond
and Van Reenen (2007) investigate large public firms.
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firms current profitability could be a poor proxy for future profitability and hence size
would proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities which are positively correlated with
investment. In other words, cash flow variables and sample splits could be detecting
other sources of mis-specification in the underlying investment model. Farre-Mensa and
Ljungqvist (2015) recently show that standard measures of financial constraints used
in the literature do not identify accurately whether a firm is actually constrained with
respect to its choices. We avoid the endogeneity problem associated with conventional
indicators of financial status, by instead relying on variation in the timing of the corpora-
tion tax payments. In the UK, large companies pay their corporation tax in each current
financial year by quarterly instalments with prepayments completed before the end of
the reporting year. In contrast, smaller companies pay in arrears: the corporation tax
payment is due nine months after the end of the financial year. Thus, for these smaller
firms, the cash flow effect of FYAs would generally only arise nine months after the end
of the financial year in which the expenditure is undertaken. If the cash flow effect is a
dominant factor contributing to the increased investment in our treated firms, we would
observe either a small or no increase in the investment rate in the first year in which
more generous FYAs become available. In fact, we find that firms paying corporation
tax in arrears increased their investment in the period before they paid their (reduced)
corporation tax liability, suggesting that it is the lower user cost of capital, rather than
the cash flow effect, that explains our findings.
Sixth, our research design also allows us to test for adjustment costs. Companies end
their financial reporting year on different dates. If there are adjustment costs, those with
a year-end closer to the announcement of more generous capital allowances will have less
time to adjust their investment plans in the current year, and will therefore react more in
their following reporting year. This is what we observe in our data. Our results also imply
that, although firms do not react immediately to increased deduction allowances, they
do so relatively quickly, within a maximum of between 12 to 18 months. This evidence
points to the existence of positive, but low adjustment costs.
Seventh, we investigate whether FYAs are salient to firms. Recent literature has
examined the salience of the tax code for companies. For example, in the US, Yagan
(2015) finds that corporate investment does not react to changes in dividend taxation
while Zwick and Mahon (2014) find that bonus depreciation provisions are salient. We
test for the salience of FYAs provisions in the UK by observing whether firms bunch at the
notches in the cost of capital created by the existence of qualifying thresholds. We find
that companies bunched just below the qualifying turnover and total assets thresholds.
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Nevertheless, we show that companies bunching at qualifying thresholds do not affect
our benchmark results, implying that FYAs are effective in stimulating investment for
a wider group of companies and not only for firms that managed to manipulate their
financial accounts.
Overall, our results show that tax incentives in the form of first-year depreciation
allowances can effectively stimulate investment. The large, positive effect of the first-year
allowances on investment is not driven by the windfall of higher post-tax cash flows,
suggesting that the reduction of the user cost of capital due to the FYAs is the main
driver of the observed increase in investment. We find firms in our sample understood the
depreciation allowances provisions in the tax code well and that they responded quickly
once they became qualified for the FYAs, indicating that adjustment costs, although
present, are not prohibitive.
2 The UK system for capital allowances
Until fiscal year 2007/08,8 the basic structure of the UK system of depreciation allowances
for plant and machinery, called capital allowances, consisted mainly of two types of al-
lowances: writing-down allowances (WDAs) for the life of the asset applied at a rate of
25 per cent on a reducing balance basis and FYAs available only to SMEs (Tiley and
Loutzenhiser, 2013).9 FYAs for plant and machinery were introduced in 1997 and made
permanent in 1998. WDAs and FYAs could be claimed only for expenditures in plant
and machinery.10 SMEs could generally claim 40 per cent FYAs on their investment,11
although small but not medium firms could temporarily claim FYAs of 50 per cent in
some years (Table 1).12
8In the UK, the fiscal year for corporate income tax purposes runs from 1 April to 31 March.
9The legislation on capital allowances is contained within the Capital Allowances Act (CAA) 2001,
as later amended (Tiley and Loutzenhiser, 2013).
10Spending on certain assets such as cars, long-life assets and plant or machinery for leasing did not
qualify. There is no statutory definition of ’plant’ or ’machinery’ in CAA 2001 but CAA 2001 provides
a list of exclusions (CAA01/S21 & 22), essentially most buildings and structures, and a specific list of
included items (CAA01/S23) such as computer software, expenditure on the provision or replacement of
integral features. The Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Capital Allowances manual states
that machinery includes machines and working parts of machines (motor vehicles, lathes, computers and
similar electronic devices). Plant is more difficult to define: the manual refers to the CAA 2001 list of
excluded and included assets and to some tests established by case law. For a discussion of what plant
and machinery is, see Tiley and Loutzenhiser (2013).
11If FYAs were claimed, WDAs could not be claimed in the same year for the same asset. WDAs
would be claimed starting from the second year of life of the assets.
12For businesses in the charge to corporation tax the increase to 50 per cent for small businesses
(not medium) applied to spending incurred between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005 and on or after
1 April 2006 (Table 1, first column). Increasing the rate of the first-year allowances also for medium-
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There are different definitions of small and medium sized businesses in UK corporate
and tax law but the relevant one for claiming FYAs is derived from EU law (Freedman,
2003). Table 2 sets out the definition.13 To be classified as small or medium for claiming
FYAs, a company needed to satisfy two of three criteria, encompassing turnover, total
assets and the number of employees in the current and preceding financial year.14
In May 2003 the European Commission adopted a Recommendation concerning the
definition of SMEs whereby the financial ceilings on turnover and total assets were sub-
stantially increased with respect to the 1996 definition.15 On 10 December 2003, the UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the implementation of the new European defi-
nition, increasing the thresholds for defining small and medium-sized businesses to the
maximum allowed under European Union regulations. This meant that the upper limits
for qualifying as an SME for FYAs purposes were more than doubled for the turnover
and total assets thresholds (Table 2, bottom panel). On that occasion, it was announced
that the change in qualifying thresholds would have effect for all qualifying expenditure
undertaken in any company financial year ending on or after 30 January, 2004. That is,
for newly qualified firms, the FYA rate of 40 per cent applied to qualifying expenditure
undertaken even before the announcement, as long as the year end of the financial year
was on or after January 30, 2004.16
On 21 March 2007 as part of the Budget, the Chancellor unexpectedly announced
a large overhaul of the capital allowances system to take effect from the following fiscal
year (2008/09) and this entailed the repeal of FYAs for plant and machinery expenditures
incurred on or after 1 April 2008.17 In the same period, the corporate statutory tax rate
sized enterprises from 40 to 50 per cent would have carried the high Exchequer cost of £180 million for
2004/05. That additional cost was deemed too high. For more details, see Standing Committee on the
Bill (2004).
13Section 247 of the 1985 Companies Act implementing EU Directive 78/660/EEC.
14Once a company qualified as SME, in order not to qualify subsequently, it had to be above two of the
thresholds for at least two consecutive years. If a firm was part of a group, the test was done at the group
level. The Companies’ Act definition of SMEs provides thresholds for qualifying as a small enterprise
(Table 2, column 2) and as a medium enterprise (Table 2, column 3). For identification purposes, we
employ variations in the thresholds for medium enterprises only. The same thresholds were relevant for
claiming SMEs research and development (R&D) tax credits (see Section 8 for further discussion of this
point). The lower thresholds for qualifying as small enterprises were relevant also for the audit exemption
but are not relevant for our analysis. Even lower thresholds were set for VAT registration, the VAT flat
rate scheme and the cash and annual accounting scheme (Crawford and Freedman, 2010).
15The Recommendation is the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning
the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (2003/361/EC). It replaced the previous
Commission Recommendation of 3 April 1996 on which the old UK definition of small and medium-sized
enterprises was based (96/280/EC).
16For all companies, whether they qualify for FYAs or not, general WDAs rates are apportioned if the
accounts span two fiscal years with different WDAs rates. Apportionment was not required for FYAs in
the first year of implementation of the new thresholds.
17From fiscal year 2008/09, the rate of WDAs was also cut to 20 per cent and the FYAs were replaced
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also changed (Table 3). The standard rate of corporation tax was cut from 33 to 30 per
cent in 1999 and to 28 per cent in 2008. The UK system levied a reduced rate (known
as the small company rate - SCR) on profits under £300,000. The SCR was reduced
from 21 per cent to 20 per cent in 1999/00, to 19 per cent in 2002/03 and then increased
again in 2007/08 to 20 per cent and to 21 per cent in 2008/09. For firms with profits
between £300,000 and £1,500,000, a system of marginal relief18 operated, which raised
the marginal rate to over 32 per cent in most years. Finally, a starting rate of between
zero and 10 per cent applied to profits below £10,000 between 2001/02 and 2005/06,
and another, higher, marginal rate was applied to the remaining profit below £50,000.19
This corporation tax schedule gives rise to both cross-sectional and time variation in the
marginal rates.
3 Identification strategy and data
3.1 Identification strategy
The changes in the turnover and total assets thresholds for claiming FYAs detailed above
implied that some firms which did not qualify for the scheme until the reform subsequently
did qualify. We employ this exogenous change in the qualifying thresholds to identify a
treatment group of firms which did not qualify for the FYAs prior to 2004 but which
became qualified for expenditure undertaken in reporting years ending from January 30,
2004 onwards. Larger firms which never qualified for FYAs constitute our main control
group.20
Before 2004, under the old regime, firms in the treatment and control groups could
by the Annual Investment Allowance, a £50,000 allowance available to all businesses (Maffini, 2013).
18For profits between £300,000 and £1.5 million, the corporation tax is calculated at the main rate
minus the marginal relief. The marginal relief is calculated as follows. Marginal relief = (£1.500,000 -
Profits) x Standard Fraction. This implies that an effective marginal rate of between and 19 and 32.5 per
cent has been applying on profits in excess of £300,000 and below £1,500,000 (Table 3). The standard
fraction was 1/40 in 2001/02 and 2007/08, 11/40 between 2002/03 and 2006/07 and 7/440 in 2008/09.
19When the starting rate was available, the marginal relief applicable on profits between £10,000 and
£50,000 was 1/40 in 2001/02 and 11/40 between 2002/03 and 2006/07.
20In Section 5, we conduct robustness checks on the definition of control and treatment group to
address the concern that larger firms could be subject to a different investment trend. In principles,
we could employ firms that were medium-sized before the reform as another control group. For such
firms, the rate of FYAs was always 40 per cent throughout our sample period (Table 1). On inspection
of the investment trends for the treated group and the medium-sized firms, we find that the parallel
trend assumption before treatment does not hold. This is not surprising as medium firms were treated
differently from the treated group before the reform and hence, they are likely to behave differently.
Firms that remained small throughout the sample period cannot be used as control group because the
rate of FYAs for them was increased to 50 per cent multiple times (Table 1).
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claim only WDAs for expenditure on plant and machinery at the rate of 25 per cent.
From 2004 onwards they faced different schedules for capital allowances. Firms in the
treatment group could depreciate qualified expenditures at 40 per cent in the first year,
and thereafter at a declining balance rate of 25 per cent. This implies an increase in
the present value of allowances of qualifying expenditure of just over 4 per cent of the
expenditure, which in turn implies a reduction in the user cost of capital of about half of
a percentage point.21 Larger firms in the control group could only use WDAs at 25 per
cent on a declining balance basis.
For our benchmark analysis, we allocate firms into the treatment and control group
on the basis of turnover only, since data on turnover is available for most firms. In
robustness checks, we use both turnover and total assets to determine whether or not a
firm is treated (see Section5). As we show below, using turnover and total assets jointly
significantly reduces the sample size. We do not use the number of employees as data on
employees is available for only 10 per cent of our sample. More specifically, we allocate
companies to the treatment group if their turnover was above £11.2 million (the old
threshold) in each year before 2004 and below £22.8 million (the new threshold) in each
year after the reform. We allocate firms into the control group if their turnover was above
£11.2 million in each year before the reform and above £22.8 million in each year after
the reform.
Four factors could influence the effectiveness of our identification strategy. First, the
control group contains only large firms, which could behave differently from the treated
firms for non-tax reasons. It is therefore important to establish that the investment trend
is similar for the treated and control groups before 2004. Figure 1 shows the evolution
of the average investment rate calculated as current investment (It) as a share of the
stock of fixed assets at the beginning of the period (Kt−1). In the sample, companies
have different reporting year ends. For firms with a year end in December,22 the first
qualifying year for FYAs is 2004. For most other firms it is 2003. In Figure 1, we code
Year 1 to be the first reporting year in which a firm was able to claim the FYAs under
the new qualifying thresholds.23 The average investment rate of both groups declined in
the year prior to the reform, but increased more for the treated immediately after the
reform. In Section 5, we present a number of robustness checks on the composition of
the control group, such as including only the smaller firms amongst those that did not
21The calculations are based on a standard definition of the cost of capital, assuming a discount rate
of 7 per cent and a tax rate of 30 per cent (see Appendix A).
22This accounts for around two thirds of our sample.
23Firms in the control group are classified accordingly.
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qualify, (Section 5.1), and using propensity score matching techniques (Section 5.2).
Second, in principle there may have been two types of anticipation effect. First, by
reacting to the December 10, 2003 announcement of higher thresholds, firms which had
a December 31, 2003 year end could have delayed investment from 2003 to 2004, in order
to benefit from the FYA available in 2004. However, this is unlikely in practice for two
reasons. First, if companies were responding to the announcement on December 10,
2003, they had very little time (about 20 days) to adjust their expenditure before the end
of the month, when their reporting year ended. Second, under reasonable assumptions
about the discount rate, it was, in any case, not worth delaying investment in this way.24
That is because whilst delaying investment would permit the firm to claim an FYA, as
a consequence it would also have to wait for an additional year until it received the
benefit from any capital allowance. Under reasonable assumptions, the present value of
allowances would have fallen if the firm had delayed claiming allowances. It therefore
seems unlikely that investment of companies with a December 2003 year end would have
fallen in anticipation of the reform being enacted for accounting year ends on or after
January 30, 2004. Nonetheless, we test for this effect directly. Figure 2 suggests that firms
with an incentive to postpone investment from 2003 to 2004, that is firms with December
year-end do not appear to have done so: in 2003 their investment rate is only slightly
lower than that of non-December firms and they did not invest more than other treated
firms in 2004. Below we test these differences with a t-test and in a triple-difference
regression framework (Section 5.4).
A second anticipation effect could be that firms foresaw the increase in thresholds and
the precise timing of the UK government’s response, following the European Commission’s
earlier announcement in May 2003. This also seems very unlikely in practice. The
European announcement was a technical change, and it was unclear how or whether the
UK would react, let alone the precise rules and timing that would be implemented. We
have been unable to find any evidence in UK media that even tax professionals expected
the announcement on December 10. However, if firms had anticipated the December
2003 announcement correctly and if they were already in their first qualifying year at
the time of anticipation (for example, firms with February 2003 year-end), they could
have started increasing the investment prior to the announcement, since any additional
investment would have received the FYA if the financial accounts ended on or after
January 30, 2004.25 Contrary to this, we find that firms already in their first qualifying
24See Appendix A for a derivation of this argument.
25It is possible that firms anticipated the announcement incorrectly, but this is hard to test without
knowing what the incorrect anticipation was.
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year at the time of the European Commission’s May or the UK government’s December
announcements increase their investment rate only in the following year, that is, in their
qualifying year 2 (Section 4.4).
It could also be argued that only the recording of investment expenditure in the tax
return was brought forward and not real investment expenditure. If this were possible,
independently of the date of end of their reporting year, all firms could have shifted
recorded investment from Year 0 to Year 1. In Section 5.5, we change our dependent
variable and use a measure of investment taken from the balance sheet which should be
less sensitive to the timing of tax incentives.
The third element which could influence our identification strategy is that the gov-
ernment could have increased the qualifying thresholds for FYAs because the investment
rate in capital stock for the firms in the treated group was relatively low. Again, the UK
government instead seemed to be responding to the technical change introduced by the
European Commission, rather than targeting a specific group of firms. However, if the
investment rate of the treated group were low, then treated firms may have had plans
to anyway increase their investment post-reform, as a reversion to the longer-run mean,
irrespective of the availability of FYAs. In this case, after an initial increase, the invest-
ment rate would decline until the optimal level of capital stock is reached. In Section 5.6
we investigate this by showing that when we take the longer-run averages by studying a
longer period (2002/03 to 2008/09 instead of 2002/03 to 2006/07), the investment rate
of the treated increases even further, showing no sign of reversion to the mean after the
increase in the first three years.
Finally, firms with a high propensity to invest regardless of the FYAs could manipu-
late their size indicators to qualify for FYAs – and the incentive for such manipulation
increased with planned investment. To examine this possibility, we analyse whether firms
bunched just below the qualifying thresholds. We do find evidence of bunching, but we
also show that our main results are robust to the exclusion of firms located in the bunching
region (Section 7).
3.2 Data
We merge two datasets to construct our sample. The first is the universe of UK cor-
poration tax returns (CT600 forms) made available for the period 2001/02 to 2008/09
on a confidential basis in the Datalab of the UK tax authority (Her Majesty’s Revenue
and Customs - HMRC). This contains detailed information on firms’ turnover, capital
allowances claimed, taxable income - and hence on the applicable marginal statutory
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corporation tax rate - and whether the firm paid the corporation tax in arrears or in
quarterly instalments. Additionally, tax returns data provide precise information on
firms’ investment in plant and machinery.26 The second dataset is FAME (Bureau Van
DijK) which collects publicly available balance sheet and income statement information
for UK companies. We use information from FAME on total assets, fixed assets and cash
flows of the firm.
We restrict the sample to the fiscal years 2002/03 to 2006/07.27 This is because in
March 2007, the UK Chancellor announced a large overhaul of capital allowances to be
phased in fiscal year 2008/09.28 Some companies may have reacted to such reform in
2007/08. Hence, we exclude fiscal years from 2007/08 onwards. To exclude outliers,
we drop observations in the top percentile of the distribution of investment rate and of
the growth rate of turnover. We construct a balanced panel which requires each firm
to have non-missing observations throughout the sample period (2002/03 to 2006/07).
The final sample consists of 17,365 firm-year observations for 3,473 firms (Table 4).29 In
our benchmark sample, 906 firms belong to the treatment group and 2,567 firms to the
control group.
Table 5 compares the two groups of firms in terms of their turnover, growth rate
of turnover, total assets, growth rate of total assets, profitability, loss carry-forwards,
marginal tax rate, investment rate, tax component of the user cost of capital,30 taxable
income, and cash flow.31 As expected, firms in the treatment group are smaller on average
26This is a major advantage of tax return data, since other data sources generally do not report
investment, and do not break down capital or investment between equipment and buildings.
27As we will explain in Section 4.1, the dependent variable (current investment over fixed assets at the
beginning of the period) requires one lag and therefore, we will not be able to include fiscal year 2001/02
in the regressions as this is the very first year in the HMRC corporate tax returns dataset.
282007 Budget report announced on 21 March 2007.
29Table 1.B in Appendix B explains in detail how we construct the sample. The sample drops by
1 million observations when we require firms to have more than one observation before and after the
reform. The sample drops further from 1,278,872 observations to 39,945 observations when we drop
small firms. As explained in Section 3.1, small firms cannot be used in our quasi experimental setting
because they underwent different changes in their capital allowances regime (see Table 1) and for this
reason, they cannot be used as a control group. Our working sample will be much smaller than the full
HMRC database because the majority of companies in the UK are small but our identification strategy
is based on identifying two specific groups of firms which are relatively large in size with respect to the
universe of UK companies. In the main dataset gathering the universe of UK tax returns, 96 per cent
of the observations could be classified as referring to a small company as they report turnover below the
threshold for qualifying as a small enterprises (£5.6 million) while 99 per cent report turnover below the
threshold for medium enterprises (£22.8 million). The requirements for the treated group are specific:
companies need not to qualify before the reform and need to qualify after the reform. This implies that
treated firms are relatively large (within the class of SMEs) as they were too large to qualifying before
the reform. The never qualifying companies are even larger.
30See Appendix A for a definition of the tax component of the user costs of capital.
31See Table 2.B in Appendix B for a definition of the variables.
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in terms of turnover and total assets than those in the control group. Table 5 also shows
that the average growth rate of turnover of treated firms is negative whilst that of the
control group is positive. This raises the possibility that some firms entered the treatment
group because their turnover had genuinely shrunk (and hence were likely to invest less)
or because they manipulated their recorded turnover. Consequently, we control for the
growth rate of turnover to avoid any downward bias caused by shrinking firms. In Section
8 we also study the possible manipulation of turnover or assets by firms that may want
to qualify for FYAs. Other variables such as profitability and the dummy for loss carry-
forwards are more comparable between the two groups. In terms of investment rate,
firms in the control group have a higher average gross investment rate and a slightly
higher percentage of observations with a positive investment rate. We further compare
the investment rate of firms in the two groups before and after the reform. Table 6 shows
that for the treated, the average investment rate for the periods after the reform (19.2 per
cent) is significantly higher than that for the periods before the reform (16.9 per cent).
The t-test shows that we can reject the null of equal means at the five per cent level.
This is not the case for the never-qualified firms. For them, we cannot reject the null
that the average investment rate after the reform (20.5 per cent) equals that before the
reform (20.3 per cent).
4 Empirical models and results
4.1 Benchmark analysis
We estimate a regression model of the following form
Iit
Ki(t−1)
= α + β1d
R
it + β2d
T
i + β3d
R
it ∗ dTi + γX it + it (1)
where Iit
Ki(t−1)
is the gross investment rate calculated as the ratio of current investment
expenditure in plant and machinery to fixed assets at the beginning of the period. dRit
is a dummy equal to one if the financial year ends on or after 30 January 2004, when
the new thresholds for qualifying for FYAs applied. dTi is a dummy equal to one for the
treatment group. The parameter of interest in the difference-in-difference analysis is the
coefficient β3 on the interactive term d
R
it ∗ dTi . It captures the effect of the treatment
in our quasi-natural experiment. In our regressions, we also control for a vector of firm
characteristics X it, which includes the growth rate of turnover, profitability, the marginal
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corporation tax rate and the growth rate of total assets.32
We discuss the importance of controlling for the growth rate of turnover below. We
control for profitability because more profitable companies are likely to invest more. We
control for the marginal tax rate to isolate the effect of capital allowances from that of
the tax rate. We control for the growth rate of total assets as slow-growing or shrinking
companies may self-select into the treatment group. We first estimate equation (1) using
an OLS and report the results in columns (1) to (5) of Table 7. Columns (6) to (9)
report within-groups estimation results. Column (1) reports the benchmark estimation
results when we do not control for any firm characteristics. It indicates that prior to the
reform, the investment rate of the treated group is 3.4 percentage points lower than that
of the control group on average. The estimate of β3 suggests that after the reform, the
investment rate of the treated group increased on average by 2.1 percentage points more
than that of the control group. Finally, on average, there is no evidence of a common
increase in investment rate for both groups as the estimated coefficient on the dummy
dRit is not statistically different from zero.
Some firms could have entered the treatment group because they were shrinking in
size, others because they manipulated their size indicators to qualify for FYAs. The
former type of firms is also likely to have a lower propensity to invest, which could bias
our estimate of β3 downward; while the latter type is likely to have a higher propensity to
invest and this may bias our estimate of β3 upward. In columns (2) to (5), we control for
the growth rate of turnover to address these concerns.33 In column (3), we add a set of
year dummies to control for common business cycle effects. In column (4) we add sector
dummies, and in column (5) we employ a full set of sector-year dummies. This controls
for the effect of the price component of the user cost of capital on investment.34 When
capital goods are in high demand, their price could increase, driving up the user cost of
capital potentially undoing the effect of higher capital allowances. In all these columns,
the estimated coefficient β3 remains positive and significant at the 5 per cent level with a
magnitude close to that in column (1). The magnitude of the estimated treatment effect
varies very little across different specifications, suggesting that the benchmark result in
column (1) is unlikely to be confounded by these factors. Nonetheless, we observe a slight
increase in the size of the estimated coefficient β3 when controlling for the growth rate
of turnover, consistent with the hypothesis that shrinking firms with a lower propensity
32Total assets include equipment but also structures, buildings and intangible assets.
33We further address the behaviour of firms manipulating their reported turnover and total assets
more specifically in Section 8.
34See Appendix A for a description of the price component of the user cost of capital.
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to invest enter the treatment group and as a result, it is likely that we underestimate
the treatment effect in column (1). For the same reason, the coefficient on the treated
dummy (dTi ) becomes smaller in absolute terms when controlling for the growth rate of
turnover.
We repeat our analysis using the within-groups estimator to control for firm-specific
fixed effects (columns (6) to (9)). The results remain robust. Taken together, Table 7
indicates that after firms in the treatment group qualified for the FYAs, their investment
rate increased by between 2.1 and 2.3 percentage points relative to firms in the control
group. At the mean, this translates into an 11 per cent increase in investment and into
an elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of about 8.7.35
4.2 Controlling for additional observables
In Table 8, we control for observable characteristics of the companies. In column (1),
we control for the marginal corporation tax rate: the higher the marginal tax rate, the
higher the user cost of capital and the lower investment, all else equal. The sign of
the coefficient on the marginal tax rate is positive (though not significant), which may
reflect the correlation between the broadly progressive UK marginal tax rate schedule
and profitability. Once we control for profitability (column (2)) the sign of the coefficient
on the marginal tax rate turns negative. The coefficient on profitability remains positive
and highly significant. To deal with the potential endogeneity of current profitability, in
column (3) we employ the lagged value of profitability. The coefficient is positive and
highly significant showing that more profitable firms also invest more. In column (4), we
control for the growth rate of total assets and unsurprisingly, firms which grow faster also
invest more. In column (5), we use a within-groups estimator.
Throughout different columns of Table 8, the estimated coefficient β3 hardly changes
and its magnitude remains similar to that reported in Table 7. Since results using OLS
and within-groups estimators are very similar, from now on we present results only from
the within-groups estimation.
4.3 The extensive margin
We next test whether higher FYAs affected the extensive margin of investment: are firms
more likely to invest in years after the reform? Table 9 reports the marginal effects
from a Probit model (columns (1) to (4)), a Logit model (column (5)) and a linear
35We assume a discount rate of 7 per cent.
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probability model (column (6)), where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals
1 if a firm made non-zero investment in plant and machinery in a particular year, and
0 otherwise. Throughout these columns, we fail to identify any significant effect at the
extensive margin: whether or not firms undertook investment seems to be unrelated to
the availability of the FYAs.
The lack of effect on the probability of undertaking investment for the treated firms
can be explained by two factors. First, in our sample, the percentage of observations
with zero investment is very low: only around 7 per cent (Table 5). Most firms invested
for at least three years during the sample period. Examining transitions, firms investing
in year t-1 are highly likely (96 per cent of them) to invest in year t, and 47 per cent of
firms not investing in year t-1 also invest in year t. Second, if there are fixed costs of
starting an investment project, a small reduction in the user cost of capital may not be
sufficient to encourage a sizeable number of firms to initiate new investment. For these
reasons, it is not surprising that we do not find any effect of the reform on the probability
of making investment, although the literature sometimes finds a significant effect (for
example, Zwick and Mahon, 2014).
4.4 Timing
Another relevant question for policy makers is how fast the tax incentives could become
effective. Answers to this question depend on various factors, including the magnitude
of costs associated with adjustments of the capital stock. Our dataset provides an ex-
ogenous variation to assess the size of adjustment costs associated with investment. As
already mentioned, companies have different end dates for their reporting year. Since the
new thresholds for FYAs were announced in December 2003 and became effective on Jan-
uary 30, 2004, companies in our treated group with accounts ending earlier in 2004 (for
example, in February and March) had less time to adjust their investment plans for Year
1 than those in the treated group with accounts ending later in 2004. For example, when
the new thresholds were announced in December 2003, firms with December year-end
were still in their qualifying Year 0. Firms with year-end in July 2004 had eight months
before the end of their Year 1 while firms with year-end on January 31, 2004, only had a
little over one month before the end of qualifying Year 1 to adjust their investment plans
for that year.
If adjustment costs are relevant, companies with financial accounts ending earlier in
2004 would be more likely to have increased their investment in Year 2 than in Year
1. In comparison, companies with accounts ending later in 2004 would be more likely
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to have increased their investment in Year 1. To test this, in Table 10, we split the
sample between firms with accounts ending between January and June (column (1)) and
those between July and December (column (2)). The results show that firms increased
investment with a time lag as we expected: the first group only increased their investment
in Year 2 and 3 while the latter group already increased their investment in Year 1.36
In columns (3) and (4) we increase the sample by relaxing the requirement of having a
balanced panel: companies only need to appear two years after the reform and two years
before that. The pattern of the results is similar, although we now observe a statistically
significant increase in investment rate for the first group of firms in Year 2. These results
are also consistent with firms with year ends in the first part of the year not increasing
investment in 2003 in anticipation of the reform announcement.
Our analysis therefore shows that companies did not react immediately to the avail-
ability of more generous FYAs, consistent with the presence of adjustment costs. Nonethe-
less, companies reacted relatively quickly, within 12 to 18 months from the announcement
of the new rules. Combined with previous results, this suggests that FYAs were not only
effective in stimulating investment but they did so rather quickly.
5 Robustness checks
We now present a series of robustness tests of the results.
5.1 Alternative control groups
By construction, firms in the control group are larger than firms in the treatment group,
and hence could be subject to different trends. Although Figure 1 shows that the invest-
ment rates of the two groups have a comparable trend before the reform, it is useful to
check whether our results are robust when we drop the largest firms in the control group.
Table 11 show the results for the baseline model when we drop the top 5 per cent (column
(1)) and the top 50 per cent (column (2)) of companies in the control group in terms of
total assets.37 The estimated coefficient β3 on the interactive term remains positive and
36We have also split the sample between firms with end date of accounts between January and May
and between June and December. This generates similar results: the coefficient β3 for Year 1 for the
group with year-end between January and May is not statistically significant (0.039) with a standard
error of 0.043. The coefficient for Year 2 is still not significant but much larger, at 0.080, with a standard
error of 0.052. For the firms with year-end between June and December, the coefficient β3 for Year 1 is
statistically significant at 5 per cent (0.031∗∗) with a standard error of 0.014. The coefficient for Year 2
is not significant (0.013), with a standard error of 0.015.
37The percentiles refer to the distribution of total assets for the firms in the control group. We have
carried out the same exercise for the same percentiles of turnover. The results are virtually identical to
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statistically significant in both columns, with a magnitude of between 2.3 and 2.4, very
close to our benchmark results of Table 7 and 8.
5.2 Propensity score matching
Next, we match companies in the control group to companies in the treatment group by
constructing a propensity score (for being treated) based on observed firm characteris-
tics. Among the different matching techniques used, we report results using the method
which yields the best balancing properties, the kernel matching method.38 To construct
the propensity score, we employ a Logit model which regresses the dummy indicating
the treatment group on the average pre-treatment growth rate of turnover, the natural
logarithm of total assets, profitability and sector dummies (Table 3.B in Appendix B).39
The balancing properties of the matching method used are reported in Table 4.B in Ap-
pendix B.40 The t-test for equal means in the treated and non-treated groups indicates
that for most variables used in the Logit regression, including the sector dummies, the
null of equal means cannot be rejected and that the standardised bias is small. This
indicates good balancing properties. Only the standardised bias for the growth rate of
turnover has a larger value but this is not extremely high (about 11 per cent).41 By con-
struction, companies in the treatment group are smaller in terms of assets and turnover
than companies in the control group. It is therefore unsurprising that it is not possible to
achieve a perfect match based on these two parameters. The matching works very well
on profitability and sector dummies, which are not directly used in the construction of
our treatment and control group. Column (3) of Table 11 reports the weighted regression
those of Table 11. Results are not reported here for brevity.
38The method is applied restricting the sample to ensure common support. We also try other match-
ing methods: a nearest-neighbour (NN) matching without replacement with common support (without
caliper), NN with replacement and no common support (without caliper), caliper matching with distance
set to 0.1 (and robustness checks on the distance up to 1), radius matching with common support and
kernel matching without common support. An analysis of the balancing properties of such matching
procedures shows that the balancing is much less satisfactory than that achieved with the kernel method
reported. The results are very similar to our previous specifications but for brevity, they are not reported
here.
39The average pre-treatment value of the covariates is calculated across qualifying Year 0, -1 and -2 if
available. We also tried to include other covariates in the regressions such as the rate of growth of total
assets, the natural logarithm of turnover and the marginal tax rate but their coefficients are insignificant
40The average pre-treatment value of the covariates is calculated across qualifying Year 0, -1 and -2 if
available. We also tried to include other covariates in the regressions such as the rate of growth of total
assets, the natural logarithm of turnover and the marginal tax rate but their coefficients are insignificant.
41The next method with the best balancing properties is the caliper matching (distance 0.1) with
common support. The absolute value of the standardised bias there is above 10 for both the rate
of growth of turnover (14.1) and for the natural logarithm of total assets (-11.5). The bias for the
profitability parameter is -2.2.
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results for the matched sample. The estimated coefficient β3 on the interaction term is
positive, statistically significant and very close in magnitude to those estimated in our
benchmark specifications.
5.3 An alternative treatment group
Next, we consider the definition of treatment group. To allocate firms to a new treatment
group, we employ two thresholds jointly: the one on total assets and the one on turnover.
For this new treatment group, we require companies to be above both qualifying thresh-
olds before the reform and below both thresholds after the reform in each year.42 This
is a stricter requirement than that used in our benchmark analysis, which implies less
measurement error in our classification. The drawback of using a stricter classification
is that we are left with a much smaller number of firms: 237 in the treatment group
(versus 906 in the benchmark specification). Column (4) of Table 11 shows that, when
employing the new definition of treatment and control group, the coefficient β3 remains
positive and highly significant but the estimated magnitude of the coefficient more than
doubles that in the benchmark estimations. This suggests that our benchmark estimates
are likely to provide a lower bound for the magnitude of the effect of increased FYAs on
firms’ investment.
5.4 Anticipatory effect
We have discussed how the possibility that firms may have anticipated the reforms may
affect the results. Specifically, firms with a reporting year-end of December 31, 2003 could
conceivably have delayed qualifying expenditure to 2004 in order to receive the benefit of
the FYA. If this anticipatory effect is driving the estimated tax effect on investment, we
should observe that the investment rate of firms with a December year-end drops relative
to other treated firms in Year 0, and increase more after the reform. Figure 2 shows that
investment for December year-end firms did drop slightly more in Year 0 than that of
other firms but the difference is very small. Additionally, investment of December firms
did not increase more than other treated firms’ investment in Year 1.43 As a further
42More specifically, to be assigned to the new treatment group, we require companies to report turnover
above £11.2 million and total assets above £5.6 million in each year before the reform (that is, in Year
-1 and 0). For years after the reform (that is, Year 1 to 3), companies are required to report turnover
below £22.8 million and total assets below £11.4 million. The control group is also constructed using
both turnover and total assets thresholds. Firms in the control group report turnover and total assets
above the old thresholds both in year -1 and 0 and above the new thresholds in Year 1, 2 and 3.
43We also tested with a t-test whether in qualifying Year 0, mean investment of treated December
firms is different from mean investment of treated non-December firms. We cannot reject the null that
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robustness check, we construct a dummy with value 1 if a firm’s reporting period ends
in December. We interact this dummy with our difference-in-differences specification to
derive a triple-differences regression. In column (5) of Table 11, the estimated coefficient
on the triple interaction (Treatment * December year-end * Years after the reform) is
insignificant, indicating that the behaviour of December firms is not different from that
of non-December firms and hence, it does not affect our benchmark results. In column
(6) we include in the benchmark difference-in-difference regression two new variables: the
interactions (Treatment * December year-end * Year 0) and (Treatment * December year-
end * Year 1). The former indicates the different behaviour of December firms in 2003,
when it is possible that they invested less than other treated firms. The latter indicates
the differential behaviour of December firms in 2004, when it is possible they invested
more than other treated. The coefficient on both variables is close to zero and statistically
insignificant, indicating that firms with a possible incentive to delay investment from 2003
to 2004 did not do so.44
5.5 An alternative measure of investment rate
A further concern is that, for the treated group, the observed higher investment rate after
the reform could be the result of overstating or relabelling investment expenditures in
the tax return rather than an increase in actual investment. To address this issue, we
use a measure of investment taken directly from the balance sheet: the growth rate of
fixed assets calculated as the difference between the natural logarithm of fixed assets at
time t and the natural logarithm of fixed assets at time t-1.45 Such a measure should
be less sensitive to the timing of tax incentives, especially for private firms such as those
analysed here which are not required to publish their accounts.46 This new dependent
variable allows us to test whether the effect we find in the previous analysis is driven
mean investment for the two groups is equal (t-test is 0.5723 with Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.5673). We run the
same test for mean investment of the two groups for qualifying Year 1 and again, we cannot reject the
null that mean investment of December firms is equal to mean investment of non-December firms (t-test
is 0.292 with Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.7704).
44In further robustness checks we constructed a dummy for firms with year-end between September and
December. In a triple difference approach, we interacted the dummy with our benchmark specification
and the coefficient on the variable ”Treatment * Years after the reform * year-end between September
and December” is insignificant (0.022) with a standard error of 0.015, indicating that firms with late
year-end do not behave differently from other treated firms. Finally, we have also dropped December
firms from our sample. The coefficients on β3 remains positive and highly significant at 0.043*** with a
standard error of 0.017. The sample is reduced to 1,024 companies.
45In the regressions, covariates such as the rate of growth of turnover and of total assets are calculated
in the same way.
46If the firm manipulates both the financial statements and the tax returns, our test will not estimate
the change in real investment.
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by over-reporting of investment in tax returns. Column (7) of Table 11 shows that the
coefficient β3 remains positive and significant with a magnitude of 2.4 percentage points,
again very close to that of our benchmark specifications.
A drawback of the dependent variable used here is that it groups together investment
in plant and equipment with investment in structures and buildings to which FYAs do not
apply. Given no obvious change in the trend of investment in structures and buildings
in the sample period, this aggregated investment rate remains informative about the
effects of the FYAs. The results in this section suggest that the FYAs were effective in
stimulating real investment rather than only providing incentives for firms to relabel their
investment.
5.6 Testing for reversion to the mean
The government could have targeted the treated group because their capital stock and
investment were lower than those of firms in the control group. If the firms in the treated
group were already planning to increase their investment and capital stock in the future,
the effects we estimate would simply be due to a reversion to the longer-run mean and
not to the effect of more generous capital allowances. In this case, the investment of the
treatment group would only be higher for a short period. If the treated group aimed to
achieve a higher optimal level of capital stock, their investment rate will increase initially
and gradually decline until the optimal level of capital stock is reached.
To address whether our results are driven by such a reversion to the mean, in column
(8) of Table 11 we use a longer time period, extending the period after the reform by two
years, although, as noted in Section 3.2, any effects of the 2004 reform may be confounded
by subsequent reforms. The results suggest that when using a longer time period, the
coefficients β3 marginally increases with respect to our benchmark specifications. This
implies that there is no evidence of reversion to the mean: after three years, investment
rate of the treated remains higher than that of the control group.
5.7 Placebo tests
We carry out two placebo tests. In the first, we use firms that were medium-sized prior
to the reform as the treated group. We continue to use the never-qualified firms as the
control group. For both groups, the rate of FYAs did not change: for medium-sized firms
the rate was 40 per cent throughout our sample period and for large firms which could
not claim FYAs, the rate remained at 25 per cent. Column (9) of Table 11 shows that
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the estimated coefficient β3 is close to zero and not statistically significant.
In the second placebo test, we create an alternative treatment group from the set of
larger firms that never qualified for FYAs (and which are therefore in our benchmark
control group). The definition of the new treatment group is somewhat arbitrary here.
In column (10), we allocate firms in the new treatment group if their turnover is above
£11.2 million (old threshold) in each year before the reform and between £45.6 (double
the actual new threshold) and £91.2 million in each year after the reform. Companies
in the new treatment group have always enjoyed WDAs at 25 per cent and hence, their
investment behaviour should not be different from that of the control group. Our results
are consistent with this hypothesis: in column (10), the coefficient β3 on the interaction
between the treatment and the post-reform dummy is not statistically different from
zero.47
6 Is the cash flow effect important?
Capital allowances may affect investment via two main channels - by lowering the cost
of capital, and for cash constrained firms, by increasing the availability of cash due
to reduced tax liabilities. In this section, we exploit variation in the timing of actual
corporation tax payments to test the relative importance of these two channels. In the
UK, larger firms with taxable income above £1.5 million in the current and preceding
financial years are not allowed to pay in arrears. Instead they are required to pay the
corporation tax liability by quarterly instalments within their financial year. However, the
majority of smaller UK companies can settle their corporation tax liability nine months
after their accounting year end. Cash savings due to a reduced tax liability would only
arise when actual taxes are paid and therefore, if the cash flow effect dominates the user
cost effect, we would expect to see no change in investment in Year 1 for treated firms
paying their corporation taxes in arrears. We test this hypothesis in Table 12. In column
47We also explored with other similar placebo tests, identifying a treatment group within the set of
large, non-qualifying companies and varying the definition of treatment. We increase the upper bound
of the turnover threshold. To do this, we refer to the distribution of turnover for the benchmark sample
and we employ the 90th percentile as an upper bound for the definition: we allocate firms in the new
treatment group if their turnover is above £11.2 million in each year before the reform and between
£45.6 and £209 million for each year after the reform. The coefficient β3 derived from a within-group
estimation is negative and statistically significant at 5 per cent (-0.21**) with a standard error of 0.008.
Finally, we decrease the lower bound. We refer to the distribution of turnover of the never qualifying
using the 10th percentile: we allocate firms in the new treatment group if their turnover was above
£11.2 million in each year before the reform and between £24.3 and £91.2 million for each year after
the reform. The coefficient β3 derived from a within-group estimation is close to zero (0.004) and not
statistically significant with a standard error of 0.008.
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(1) a company is defined as paying in arrears if its taxable income in Year 0 and Year
1 is below £1.5 million. As a robustness check, in column (2), companies are defined as
paying in arrears if their taxable income is below £1.5 million in each year in our sample
period.48
In column (1) and (2) of Table 12, we show that firms with accounts ending in the
second half of the calendar year (from July to December)49 and settling their tax liabilities
in arrears still react strongly to the reform in their Year 1: the estimated coefficient on
the interaction between the treatment dummy and the dummy for Year 1 is positive
and significant. This indicates that the cash flow effect on investment is unlikely to be
important for these firms.50
This finding seems to be at odds with some previous studies (for example, Zwick
and Mahon, 2014) who find the cash-flow effect associated with bonus depreciation to be
important.51 However, our results could arise if firms in our sample were not financially
constrained: throughout our sample period (2002/01-2006/07), the UK economy was
expanding at an average GDP growth rate of 3 per cent per annum and hence, was in
a boom period.52 In this period, credit was also easily available.53 By contrast, bonus
depreciation in the US was implemented during two economic downturns.54 Nonetheless,
48Overall, in the main regression sample, 2,285 firms always pay in arrears (66 per cent) and 1,188
firms always pay in instalment. Nonetheless, the regressions in this section focus on firms with year-end
between July and December. See column (1) and (2) of Table 12 for the number of firms paying in
arrears used in such regressions.
49As explained in Section 4.4, firms with year-end between July and December should have sufficient
time to adjust their investment plans in Year 1.
50In further robustness checks, we employed a within-groups estimator in a triple difference approach
where we constructed a dummy for firms always paying in instalments and interacted it with the bench-
mark difference-in-difference model. The sample contains both firms paying in arrears and in instalments.
All firms have a year-end of accounts between July and December. The coefficient on the triple interac-
tion (Treated * always paying in instalments * Year 1) is close to zero and not statistically significant
(-0.007) with a standard error of 0.040, indicating that firms paying in instalments and firms paying in
arrears responded in a similar way to more generous capital allowances in Year 1. The coefficient on the
variable (Treated * Year 1) remains positive and significant at 5 per cent (0.037**) as in column (2) of
Table 12, with a standard error of 0.016. The sample increases to 15,230 observations for 3,046 firms.
51Devereux and Liu (2015) also find a cash flow effect on investment for very small and new UK
corporations.
52Long-term profile of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the UK, ONS, 23 August 2013. Avail-
able at: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/elmr/explaining-economic-statistics/long-term-profile-of-gdp-
in-the-uk/sty-long-term-profile-of-gdp.html
53Lending to UK businesses was rapidly expanding between December 2003 (when higher thresholds
were announced) and December 2006, often growing at double digits yearly rates. By comparison, in the
years during and following the global financial crisis (between March 2009 and December 2013), lending
contracted by about 4.2 percent per year (Bank of England, 2009, 2010).
54In 2002 and 2003, when the bonus depreciation deduction was in force, the debt of the US corporate
sector did not grow: the rate of growth was 0.1 in both years and it declined sharply by 5.4 and 1.2
per cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively when the bonus depreciation was introduced for the second time
(Federal Reserve, 2004, 2012).
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some firms in our sample appear to be financially constrained as indicated by a standard
cash flow measure.
As a robustness check, we use more conventional cash flow measures to identify firms
that are likely to be financially constrained, although Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015)
find that standard measures of financial constraints55 may not identify very well whether
a firm is actually financially constrained. We adopt a triple-difference approach where
we interact a dummy indicating financially constrained companies with our benchmark
specification of equation (1). We assume companies are more likely to be financially
constrained (a) if they had negative lagged cash flow (Table 12 - column (3)), or (b) if
they had a lagged cash flow below the sample mean (Table 12 - column (4)).56 Cash
flow is defined as the sum of profits before tax plus depreciation as a share of total
assets.57 In Table 12, we find that firms classified as financially constrained do not
reacted differently from firms that are unconstrained. In other literature, it is sometimes
argued that smaller firms are more likely to be financially constrained and hence, firm
size seems to be another indicator of firms’ financial status. This does not seem to be
true in our dataset as Figure 3 shows that the relationship between size and cash flow
is non-monotonic. For this reason, we do not employ size as a measure of financial
constraints.58 As another approach, we identify firms in our sample that belong to a
corporate group using ownership information in FAME.59 Such firms are less likely to be
financially constrained if there is an efficient internal, group capital market and hence,
they should react less than stand-alone firms if the cash flow effect is important. In
column (5) of Table 12 we implement a triple difference approach with a dummy for
55Such measures are for example, credit rating, paying dividends, cash flow measures from the financial
statements, age, size and leverage or a linear combination of them as in the Kaplan-Zingales, Whited-Wu,
and Hadlock-Pierce indices.
56Among the treated, 17 per cent of the observations have negative lagged cash flow and 48 per cent
have lagged cash flow above the mean. In the control group, 12 per cent of the observations have negative
lagged cash flow and 49 per cent have lagged cash flow above the mean. Mean cash flow for the sample
is 0.77 and the median is very close, at 0.075 so that using the median does not change our results.
57See Table 2.B in Appendix B. We used the lagged value of cash flow to avoid endogeneity problems.
58As an indicator of financial constraints, the literature often uses the fact that a firm distributes
dividends or not. In our sample, we have no information on dividend distribution.
59Using the ownership information available in FAME, we define companies as part of a group if they
directly or indirectly own more than 50 per cent of some subsidiaries or if they are owned directly or
indirectly by another corporation. If one of the entities in the group is a foreign entity, the company
is classified as belonging to a multinational group. Otherwise, it belongs to a domestic group. When
ownership information in FAME is not available but the company records infra-group debt or claims
group relief in the tax return, it is classified as belonging to a group, although we cannot say whether it
is a domestic or a multinational group. Firms without subsidiaries or corporate owners are classified as
stand-alone companies. By this definition, in our sample 90 per cent of the firms (3,120) are part of a
corporate group and the rest are stand-alone companies. Among the treated, 753 firms (83 per cent) are
part of a group and 153 are stand-alone. For the control group, 2,367 (92 per cent) are part of a group
and 200 are stand-alone.
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standalone companies interacted with the benchmark specification. The coefficient β3
remains positive, significant and close in magnitude to our benchmark specifications.
The coefficient on the triple interaction (Treated * Years after reform * Stand-alone
company ) is negative but statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no evidence
that stand-alone firms which are more likely to be financially constrained, respond more
to generous capital allowances.
As discussed in Section 1, conventional indicators of financial constraints may suffer
from endogeneity. We avoid such problems by using heterogeneity across firms regarding
the timing of settling their actual corporation tax liability to identify the cash flow effect
associated with the FYAs.
7 Bunching at qualifying thresholds and the endo-
geneity of the treatment status
The presence of higher FYAs available only for companies below a certain size threshold
creates notches in the cost of capital.60 To qualify for FYAs, companies may manipulate
their size. If this is the case, we should observe an abnormal mass to the left of the
threshold in the distributions of turnover or total assets, and missing mass to the right.61
This is exactly the behaviour we observe in our sample. The top panel of Figure 4
shows that companies bunched just to the left of the old turnover threshold (£11.2m)
before the reform (Year 0, -1, -2) but that this excess mass disappeared after the reform
(bottom panel of Figure 4). Instead, companies bunched at the new turnover threshold
(£22.8m) in Year 1, 2 and 3 (bottom panel of Figure 5), though not before the reform
(upper panel of Figure 5).62 The same pattern appears for the total assets thresholds.63
Companies bunching at the thresholds seem to have understood the tax provisions, sug-
gesting that the FYAs were salient to them.64
60For a definition of a tax notch, see Slemrod (2013).
61We cannot analyse the distribution of the number of employees as the variable is missing for 90 per
cent of our firm-year observations and the information is generally reported only for larger firms (above
250 employees). This implies that the distribution will not be representative of the universe of firms.
62The graphs above are drawn for a larger sample of companies (1,278,872) than our regression sample.
With the smaller sample we employ in our regressions, we would not be able to present the graphs as
the HMRC only allows us to reproduce bins containing more than 30 observations. When plotting the
distribution of turnover and total assets for our regression sample, many of the bins contain less than 30
observations, especially on the right hand side of the thresholds where the missing mass is located. For
a description of the sample containing 1,278,872 observations, see note i in Table 1.B in Appendix B.
63See Figure 1.B and 2.B in Appendix B.
64The same threshold is relevant for claiming R&D tax credits for SMEs. In our regression sample,
the bunching firms do not claim R&D tax credits, according to their tax return.
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The bunching behaviour of companies indicates possible self-selection into the treat-
ment group. If these self-selected firms also had a higher propensity to invest regardless
of the tax incentives, our estimated treatment effect would be biased upward. In the
difference-in-difference analysis, to remove the possible bias, we have therefore also ex-
cluded firms that bunched below the new qualifying threshold for turnover.65 Table 13
shows that, in this case, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the treat-
ment and post-reform dummies remains positive and highly significant and its magnitude
is virtually the same as that in the benchmark results.66 This implies that FYAs were ef-
fective in stimulating investment for a wider group of companies other than only affecting
the behaviour of firms that were able to manage their size indicators.
8 Conclusion
Using confidential UK corporation tax return data, we analyse the effects of tax incentives
on investment spending. We exploit a change in the user cost of capital for medium-size
UK firms brought about by an exogenous variation in the qualifying thresholds for higher
first year capital allowances. We find that access to more generous capital allowances
increases firms’ investment by between 2.1 and 2.6 percentage points, or 11 per cent,
relative to firms that never qualified for the more generous treatment. In contrast to
much of the rest of the literature, we do not find evidence of a cash flow effect and hence,
this increase was due to the reduction in the user cost of capital, implying an elasticity
of investment with respect to the user cost of around 8.7. This result remains robust
throughout a number of tests. Although treated firms reacted to the more generous
FYAs with a small time lag due to the existence of adjustment costs, they increased
investment relatively quickly.
By investigating the distribution of turnover and total assets, we show that the some-
what complex UK legislation on capital allowances is salient to our medium-sized firms:
companies bunch just below the qualifying thresholds on total assets and turnover. This
suggests that our sample of firms understands investment tax incentives well. However,
the positive effect on investment of treated firms is not driven by firms that managed to
manipulate their size indicators.
65We define bunching as having trading turnover between £22 million and £22.8 million included at
least once after the reform. This implies dropping 49 firms within the treated group (5.4 per cent of the
treated).
66The same results are obtained if we drop companies clustering around the new threshold for total
assets. For brevity, we do not report results here.
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Tables
Table 1: Rates of capital allowances for plant and machinery in first year (%)
Small (always qualifying for FYAs) Medium (always qualifying for FYAs) Treated* Large**
2001/02 40 40 25 25
2002/03 40 40 25 25
2003/04 40 40 25 25
2004/05 50 40 40 25
2005/06 40 40 40 25
2006/07 50 40 40 25
2007/08 50 40 40 25
2008/09 20 20 20 20
* Treated firms were large before the 2004/05 change in the definition of SMEs, so they could not qualify for
FYAs. ** Large firms never qualified for FYAs.
Table 2: Conditions for qualifying as SME for FYAs purposes
Category Small Medium-sized
Before the reform: for financial years ending before 30 January 2004
Annual turnover not more than £2.8m not more than £11.2m
Assets not more than £1.4m not more than £5.6m
Employees not more than 50 not more than 250
After the reform: for financial years ending on or after 30 January 2004
Annual turnover not more than £5.6m not more than £22.8m
Assets not more than £2.8m not more than £11.4m
Employees not more than 50 not more than 250
Table 3: Corporate income tax rates (%)
Taxable income - (£) 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Corporate income tax marginal rates*
0 - 10,000 10 0 0 0 0 19 20 21
10,001 - 50,000 22.5 23.75 23.75 23.75 23.75 19 20 21
50,001 - 300,000 20 19 19 19 19 19 20 21
300,001 - 1,500,000 32.5 32.75 32.75 32.75 32.75 32.75 32.5 29.75
Over 1,500,000 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 28
*For taxable income between £300,000 and £1.5 million, the corporation tax is calculated at the main rate mi-
nus the marginal relief. The marginal relief is calculated as follows. Marginal relief = (£1.5m - Profits) x Stan-
dard Fraction. This implies that an effective marginal rate of between 19 and 32.5 per cent has been applying
on profits in excess of £300,000 and below £1,500,000. The standard fraction was 1/40 in 2001/02 and 2007/08,
11/40 between 2002/03 and 2006/07 and 7/440 in 2008/09. When the starting rate was available, the marginal
relief applicable on profits between £10,000 and £50,000 was 1/40 in 2001/02 and 11/40 between 2002/03 and
2006/07.
Table 4: Sample composition
Observations Companies % of total companies
Treated 4,530 906 26%
Never qualifying 12,835 2,567 74%
Total 17,365 3,473
30
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean St. Dev.
Trading turnover
TREATED 4,530 15,700,000 4,864,624
NEVER 12,835 169,000,000 828,000,000
Growth rate of turnover
TREATED 4,530 -2.42% 0.17
NEVER 12,835 7.06% 0.18
Total assets
TREATED 4,530 26,100,000 120,000,000
NEVER 12,835 219,000,000 4,020,000,000
Growth rate of total assets
TREATED 4,530 -0.073% 0.632
NEVER 12,835 0.021% 0.721
Profitability
TREATED 4,530 4.40% 0.08
NEVER 12,835 5.23% 0.09
Dummy for loss carry forward used in CT600
TREATED 4,530 11.92% 0.32
NEVER 12,835 11.09% 0.31
Marginal tax rate
TREATED 4,530 14.33% 0.15
NEVER 12,835 17.01% 0.15
Gross investment rate
TREATED 4,530 18.28% 0.33
NEVER 12,835 20.45% 0.34
Perc. of positive values for gross investment rate
TREATED 4,530 91.90% 0.27
NEVER 12,835 93.57% 0.25
Tax component of the user cost of capital
TREATED 4,530 32.18% 0.010
NEVER 12,835 32.47% 0.027
Growth rate of the tax component of the user’s cost of capital
TREATED 4,026 -0.089% 0.019
NEVER 11,267 0.039% 0.021
Perc. of observations with zero taxable income
TREATED 4,530 46.60% 0.50
NEVER 12,835 40.48% 0.49
Cash flow
TREATED 4,407 0.063% 0.305
NEVER 12,527 0.082% 0.306
(i) Variables are defined in Table 2.B in Appendix B.
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Table 13: Regressions excluding companies bunching at turnover thresholds
(1) (2) (3)
Dep var: It
Kt−1
- gross investment rate OLS FE
Treated group - dummy -0.037*** -0.021**
(0.010) (0.010)
Treatment dummy * dummy for years after reform 0.020** 0.026** 0.025**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Rate of growth of turnover 0.160*** 0.109***
(0.018) (0.019)
Marginal tax rate -0.086*** -0.045*
(0.025) (0.024)
Lagged profitability 0.474*** 0.303***
(0.055) (0.061)
Rate of growth of total assets 0.008 0.015***
(0.005) (0.006)
Dummy - years after reform 0.002
(0.005)
Sector*year dummies Yes Yes
Constant 0.203*** 0.300** 0.164***
(0.006) (0.144) (0.034)
R-squared 0.001 0.064 0.020
Observations 17,120 17,120 17,120
Number of companies 3,424 3,424 3,424
(i) Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial
correlation. (ii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
(iii) In all columns, companies bunching at the turnover threshold are dropped. These are
companies with trading turnover between £22m and £22.8m at least once in Year 1, 2 or
3 are dropped. (iii) In column (1) and (2), we use an OLS estimator. In column (3), we
use a within-groups estimator. For columns (3), the R-squared is the within R-squared.
Figures
Figure 1: Average gross investment rate (It/Kt−1)
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Figure 2: Average gross investment rate for December and non-December firms
Figure 3: Mean cash flow, by quintile (treated only)
Note: cash flow calculated as defined in Table 2.B in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Distribution of turnover around old thresholds (between £10m and £12m)
Figure 5: Distribution of turnover around new thresholds (between £20m and £24m)
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Appendix A - User cost of capital and elasticities
A.1 The user cost of capital
A standard definition of the user cost of capital, for investment financed by retained
earnings, is67
c =
(1− A)
(1− τ) (r + δ) (2)
where A is the present value of the tax saving due to capital allowances for a unit
increase in investment, τ is the marginal corporate tax rate (30%), r is the interest rate
which we assume is 7% and δ is the economic rate of depreciation which we assume is
15%. (1−A)
(1−τ) is the tax component of the user cost of capital. (r+δ) is the price component
of the user cost of capital.
Before the reform, the rate of tax depreciation is d = 0.25:
A = τd{1 + 1− d
1 + r
+ (
1− d
1 + r
)2 + (
1− d
1 + r
)3 + ...} = τd(1 + r)
(r + d)
= 0.8359τ
In the case in which the asset receives an allowance of f = 40% in the first year, and
then subsequently d on a declining balance basis, then
A = τf +
τd(1− f)
1 + r
{
1 +
(
1− d
1 + r
)
+
(
1− d
1 + r
)2
+
(
1− d
1 + r
)3
+ ...
}
= τf +
τd(1− f)
r + d
= 0.8688τ (3)
dA = 0.0328τ ; c = 0.2354; dc = −0.0031; dc
c
= −0.0131.
Our baseline result is dIt
Kt−1
= 0.021. The average investment rate for the treated is
0.1828, so that d( It
Kt−1
)/ It
Kt−1
= 0.1149. This implies that the elasticity of investment rate
with respect to the user cost of capital is e = −8.74. For given K(t−1), the change in
investment is equal to the change in the capital stock: dIt = dKt so that the elasticity of
67See, for example, Devereux and Griffith (2003).
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capital stock to the user costs is E = dIt
dc
∗ c
Kt
= e It
Kt
= −1.598
A.2 Anticipation effect
If the company has a December year-end, does ti have an incentive to postpone invest-
ment from December 2003 to January 2004? Assume discounting in the first year and
r = 7%
Option 1. The company declares £1 of investment in December 2003. The present
value of allowances is approximately
A =
0.25
r + 0.25
= 0.78125 (4)
Option 2. The company declares £1 of investment in January 2004. The company
enjoys FYAs but no additional year of discounting. The present value of allowances is
approximately
A =
0.4
(1 + r)2
+
(1− 0.4)
(1 + r)2
∗ 0.25
r + 0.25
= 0.7588 (5)
The fact that (3) is larger than (4) suggests no incentive to delay.
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Appendix B
Table 1.B: Building the sample
(1) (2)
Observations Companies
Firms classifiable as small, medium, treated or never qualifying (2002/03-2006/07) 3,045,890 452,196
Drop if fixed assets zero or negative (158,051)
Remaining 2,887,839 448,076
Drop if only observations before or only after reform (629,764)
Remaining 2,258,075 332,655
Drop if only one observation before or after reform (917,514)
Remaining 1,340,561 190,293
Drop if firms changes month of end of accounts (61,689)
Remainingi 1,278,872i 181,333
Keep if medium, treated or never qualifying (drop small firms) (1,238,927)
Remaining 39,945 5,713
Drop if less than 5 observations between Year -1 and 3 (3,378)
Remaining 36,567 5,133
Drop outliers (12,552)
Remaining 24,015 4,803
(i) The analysis of bunching in Figures 3 and 4 (and 1.B and 2.B) is derived on the sample with 1,278,872 obser-
vations.
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Table 2.B: Definition of variables
Variable Box in tax return FAME line
Investment Gross investment rate ( Iit
Ki(t−1)
)
constructed using Qualifying expenditure for FYAs (Iit) 118 & 121
i
Fixed assets (Ki(t−1)) 37
Output Rate of growth of turnover
turnit−turni(t−1)
turnit
1
Profitability Incit
TAit
constructed using Taxable income (Incit) 37
Total assets (TAit) 70
Marginal tax rate
constructed using Taxable income (Incit) 37
Growth Rate of growth of total assets
TAit−TAi(t−1)
TAit
70
Investment (FAME) Rate of growth of fixed assets (ln(Kit)− ln(Ki(t−1)))
constructed using Fixed assets (Kit) 37
Cash flow
(P&Lafter tax+depreciation)it
TAit
constructed using P&L after tax 16
Depreciations 21
Total assets (TAit) 70
Tax payment method
constructed using Taxable income (Incit and Inci(t−1)) 37
Sector UK SIC 2007 First 2 digits
(i) Box 118 contains the total expenditure for investment in plant and machinery incurred in the accounting pe-
riod on which FYAs are claimed. Box 121 contains the total expenditure on machinery and plant but excludes
any amount entered in box 118. For firms in the control group (never qualifying), Iit is calculated as box 121.
For firms in the treatment group, Iit is calculated as the sum of box 118 and box 121. The reason is the follow-
ing. FYAs were not granted for all plant and machinery (for example, cars and other miscellaneous items were
excluded). From the tax return and for the periods before the reform, it is not possible to distinguish plant and
machinery for which FYAs were granted from the total pool of plant and machinery recorded in box 121.
Table 3.B: Logit regression for propensity score
Dep var: dummy = 1 if companies is treated Logit
Rate of growth of turnover - 6.627***
(0.475)
Ln(total assets) -1.748***
(0.099)
Profitability -2.574***
(0.621)
Sector dummies Yes
Constant 29.069***
(1.724)
Log-likelihood -2503.05
Pseudo R2 0.3674
Observations 6,848
(i) Standard errors in parentheses and robust to het-
eroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation.
(ii) ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
(iii) The number of observations is small because the match-
ing is carried out on an average of pre-treatment variables.
We have collapsed the pre-treatment sample to do so.
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Table 4.B: Test of balancing property of kernel matching
Treated Never %bias t p > t
Rate of growth of turnover -0.020 -0.035 11.2 3.25 0.001
Ln(total assets) 16.288 16.361 -6.7 -2.57 0.061
Profitability 0.04861 0.0475 1.3 0.42 0.674
(i) We carried out the tests reported in this table using the Stata com-
mand -pstest. (ii) We have included also sector dummies, for all of them
the null hypothesis of equality of means cannot be reject at levels below
5 per cent.
B.2 Figures
Figure 1.B: Distribution of total assets around old thresholds (£4m - £6m)
Figure 2.B: Distribution of total assets around new thresholds (£10m - £12m)
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